Due to temporary access restrictions, embargoed data cannot be refreshed to unlimited parties during the embargo time interval. A solution to mitigate the risk of data loss has been developed that uses a data dissemination framework, the Timed-Locked Embargo Framework (TLEF), that allows data refreshing of encrypted instances of embargoed content in an open, unrestricted scholarly community. TLEF exploits implementations of existing technologies to "timelock" data using timed-release cryptology so that TLEF can be deployed as digital resources encoded in a complex object format suitable for metadata harvesting. The framework successfully demonstrates dynamic record identification, time-lock puzzle encryption, encapsulation and dissemination as XML documents. We implement TLEF and provide a quantitative analysis of its successful data harvest of time-locked embargoed data with minimum time overhead without compromising data security and integrity.
INTRODUCTION
The traditional subscription-based journal model provides information at a cost, making it difficult to afford, especially by researchers in developing countries. This access model has served as a catalyst for the Open Access (OA) movement, which is aimed at providing access to full-text journal articles online toll-free. Advocates of OA argue the Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy otherwise, to republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. subscription-based journal access system hinders free and open flow of ideas and information, while proponents of the traditional system argue that it governs and manages the flow of information, and ensures the maintenance of standard and structure of this information [16] . A balance needs to be achieved in order to ensure continuance of flow of scholarly information and coverage of publication costs by integrating the advantages contained in both these access models.
Embargoed access (i.e., Romeo color "yellow" [1] ) to academic material is a hybrid of the restricted, traditional access model and the toll-free, Open Access model. It is a temporary restriction imposed by the publisher on the full-text availability of the latest issues of a journal for a certain timeperiod, for example, two years, while the economic value of the journal is extracted. Individuals and institutions would have to subscribe to the journal in order to access the latest issues, while the previous issues are available to digital repositories and individuals without subscription cost. This access model has been formulated and adopted by various journals in order to cover publication costs while supporting easy information access [18] , a factor that was lacking in the OA cost-recovery model. This allows the publishers to generate revenue from their subscription business during the embargo period as well as include the journal articles in the aggregated databases to improve research accessibility to the scholarly community.
No single digital preservation strategy is appropriate for all data types [12] . The fundamental idea of digital preservation is to not rely on a single method of digital preservation, but to utilize various strategies, such as data refreshing, migration and emulation to ensure data longevity and integrity. Data refreshing is the copying of bits to different systems that are distributed to various heterogeneous locations so that, if one copy is destroyed by accidental or malicious means, other copies can be accessed to recover the local copy of the content. This method of digital preservation can be applied to preserve content that is freely accessible online, but data that has temporarily restricted, embargoed access cannot be preserved by this method.
During the embargo period, users and researchers that have not subscribed to the embargoed journal are unable to access this restricted information. Therefore, there is a limit to the number of people who can refresh this embargoed information, placing it at a risk during this embargo time interval, which we term the "Preservation Risk Interval". We mitigate this risk of data loss associated with embargoed information by suggesting a data dissemination model that allows data refreshing of embargoed content in an open, unrestricted scholarly community. This is in contrast with trusted repository models such as CLOCKSS 1 and Poritco 2 . The Timed-Locked Embargo Framework (TLEF) has been developed by exploiting implementations of existing technologies to "time-lock" and encrypt data using Timed-Release Cryptology [15] so that it can be deployed as digital resources encoded in the MPEG-21 Digital Item Description Language (DIDL) complex object format [3] to harvesters interested in harvesting a local copy of content by utilizing The Open Archives Initiative Protocol for Metadata Harvesting (OAI-PMH) [10] .
BACKGROUND

Timed-Release Crypto
Conventional key-generation algorithms, such as the RSA encryption algorithm [14, 8] , have encryption keys that are a composite of two large prime numbers, p and q, of approximately equal size
where n is used to produce both the public and private keys. It consists of modular arithmetic used to calculate the factors of large numbers whose complexity is dependent on the size of the numbers used. The complexity of the puzzle generated is just the complexity of the factoring problem. If brute force were to be applied to break the key, estimated computation time can be reduced by k, by dedicating k computers to compute the product in parallel. For timed release crypto, a non-parallelizable key encryption system is proposed,
is calculated, T being the amount of time in seconds for which the puzzle is to be time-locked and S represents the computational power of the machine. A random key can be generated using a conventional cryptosystem, where the key may consist of enough bits to be considered sufficiently complicated, and cannot be easily examined and broken. Calculating inputs n (from equation 1), and a random a, where 1 < a < n, the encryption key can be encrypted as
The output of the time-lock puzzle is thus (n, a, t, encrypted key, encrypted resource). Input variables, such as p and q that were used during the computation of the puzzle, are destroyed. Without p and q, searching for the key to solve a puzzle that is encrypted using this method is impractical, rendering brute force methods of breaking the encryption key nonparallelizable. The most efficient method of retrieving the encryption key would be to calculate the variable
initially used during key encryption. This can be achieved by sequentially performing t squarings on the value a. This 1 www.clockss.org 2 www.portico.org requires a dedicated computer performing continuous, sequential computation for approximately t time units to decrypt the key and thus break the encryption. This encryption method can be applied with various, carefully selected values of time unit t to encapsulate the resource for a predetermined amount of time, which is equivalent to the resource embargo period, ensuring that the resource is not released until the desired computation time t has elapsed. Another existing approach to timed-release encryption is the use of a third party intervention, or Trusted Agents (TA). The use of TAs does not require usage of the receiver's computation resources. A time-server(s) intercedes as the negotiator between the content source and the client who is trying to access the content. During content encryption, a pair of private keys is produced. The client receives an encrypted instance of the content, as well as one of the private keys, later used for identity verification. The other key from the pair, required for successful decryption and accessibility of content, is received from the time-server only after the required embargo period has elapsed [6, 4] . Although this approach is possible within TLEF, we do not require the use of TAs.
OAI-PMH Resource Harvesting
In prior work, we have extended the OAI-PMH framework to allow for resource harvesting by using complex object metadata formats to include the resource (e.g., PDF, JPEG) either by reference (URI) or by value (base64 encoded) [19] . The Apache mod oai module has been designed to implement OAI-PMH resource harvesting for all files and URIs on a webserver where the baseURL is the hostname with "/modoai" appended [17] . It implements all of the OAI-PMH selective harvesting features such as the fromuntil parameters and set parameters. It supports the oai dc metadata prefix that returns technical metadata about the valid URIs. The oai didl metadata prefix is used to return metadata and the resource itself and is based on a profile of the MPEG-21 Digital Item Declaration Language [2] .
The MPEG-21 DID Abstract Model is complex, but offers the flexibility to accurately describe and encompass a digital object and related metadata. The resource entity is the actual, identifiable datastream, either digital or nondigital, such as a picture, a video clip, a text document, or a painting in a museum. A component entity is used to group together resources and related information about these resources wrapped in a descriptor/statement entity construct. A DID item is the point of entry for information pertaining to one resource. It groups together one or more descriptor/statement constructs. Items may contain other items, each representing one instance of the resource. Figure 1 is an abstracted view of a resource expressed in MPEG-21 DIDL.
THE PRESERVATION RISK INTERVAL
Emerging preservation systems are drifting towards open architectures where various distributed systems may be networked together to trigger notifications and preservation techniques, such as replication, migration and emulation. This innovative approach signifies that preservation of scholarly material via replication is no longer limited to supporting institutions, but is diffusing to a much broader and generic community of interest. This requires a more robust content dissemination system that can be expanded to include dissemination of embargoed content. Consider a repository of journal articles where the older issues are open access but the latest issues are embargoed. The records contained in the latest issue need to be identified and time-locked before data dissemination. The embargo period of the records would begin at the time of article publication. The repository provides a predetermined number of instance updates of each record with successively weaker time-locks. Thus, every record update is a weaker timelocked encryption that requires less time to break and consequently access the data. The last instance update would be an unlocked version of the record at the end of the embargo time period.
Time-locking embargoed records in an institutional repository for the purpose of digital preservation during data dissemination introduces an overhead. This is the time required to unlock the records in order to effectively access a decrypted version of the records. The establishment of nomenclature, as described in Table 1 , is thus imperative for assessing the amount of time required to effectively unlock and access the time-locked records held in the repository.
Let us assume the existence of a repository R that consists of a set of records such as R = {aw, bx...kz}, where the subscript for each record instance is the remaining embargo time period for that record. This repository R contains an initial number of R(0) records at time i = 0. The records are initially time-locked for a total embargo period embargo length , with a predetermined number of embargo decrement embargoed record updates. The embargo period begins at the time of record publication, which is at datestamp embargostart. This repository is updated at every time unit i when the existing records in the repository are updated with a new embargo period time-lock. All records in the repository will be updated with a new embargo period with every reposi-
number of records in repository at time i R update record updates to repository per time unit
initial number of records in repository at i = 0
number of records at harvester at time i H update harvester update frequency per time unit. H update = 0.5 means data harvest every 2 units
initial number of records at harvester at i = 0 publisherstart publisher-imposed global datestamp after which all records published in the are repository embargoed embargostart creation date for embargoed record embargo end end date for record embargo period, after time period embargo length has elapsed embargo length embargo time period for each record embargo decrement number of times the record time-lock is decreased (i.e., total number of record updates) rx record with embargo period = x, with x = 0 as an unlocked record a3 b3 c3 d3 e3 i = 0 time i = 0 with R(0) = 5 records a2 b2 c2 d2 e2 f3 i = 1 5 records updated, 1 new record published a1 b1 c1 d1 e1 f2 g3 i = 2 6 records updated, 1 new record published a0 b0 c0 d0 e0 f1 g2 h3 i = 3 unlocked records at i = embargo length = 3 . . . a0 b0 c0 . . . p0 q0 r1 s2 t3 i = 15 R update × embargo length = 3 records locked ∀i > embargo length Table 2 :
Behavior of an active repository with embargoed records, with R(0)=5 records, embargo length =3 months and R update =1 record.
tory update. The repository also grows linearly, by R update records with every update.
For example, consider a scenario where repository R has: R(0) = 5, R update = 1 (one new record is published with every repository update), total embargo period for each record embargo length = 3 months, and embargo decrement = 3 (the number of times the record time-lock is decreased, before an unlocked instance is published). Table 2 describes the number of records and their embargo period with respect to time.
As the repository begins with an initial number of records R(0), which have been time-locked for time period embargo length , the total amount of time spent on unlocking the records would differ with the time elapsed (i). If the elapsed time is less than the time-lock period embargo length , then the repository would not yet contain any unlocked records. The amount of time required to unlock the records would then be the sum of the embargo period of the initial R(0) number of records and the records added to R since i = 0 would be (∀embargo length − i > 0):
If the elapsed time is more than the embargo period, the Repository Time Harvester a3 b3 c3 ←− i = 0 a3 b3 c3 a2 b2 c2 d3 i = 1 a3 b3 c3 a1 b1 c1 d2 e3 ←− i = 2 a1 b1 c1d2 e3 a0 b0 c0 d1 e2 f3 i = 3 a1 b1 c1d2 e3 a0 b0 c0 d0 e1 f2 g3 ←− i = 4 a0 b0 c0 d0 e1 f2 g3 a0 b0 c0 d0 e0 f1 g2 h3 i = 5 a0 b0 c0 d0 e1 f2 g3 ∅ ←− i = 6 a0 b0 c0 d0 e1 f2 g3 ∅ i = 7 a0 b0 c0 d0 e1 f2 g3 ∅ ←− i = 8 a0 b0 c0 d0 e1 f2 g3 Table 3 : Repository with R(0) = 3 records, embargo length = 3 and R update = 1. Harvester with H update = 0.5. Repository dies at i = 6.
initial R(0) records would be unlocked, requiring computation on the time-locked records added to the repository since time i. An embargo period less than or equal to zero refers to an unlocked record. Thus, the computation time required to access these records would be (∀embargo length − i > 0):
Therefore, at time i = 15, the computation time required to access all the records available in the repository, since 3 − 15 < 0, = r1 + s2 + t3, there will be embargo length = 3 time-locked records, embargoed for time period 1, 2 and 3 respectively, which will require 1 + 2 + 3 = 6 months of dedicated computation to be accessed. Table 3 shows a repository with R(0) = 3, embargo length = 3 and R update = 1. The repository dies at i = 6 and does not come back online. A harvester with H update = 0.5 has been harvesting the repository ("←−" indicates a harvesting operation). The harvester has unlocked versions of records a, b, c, and once it determines the repository is not coming back online it can begin to break the encryption on records e, f, g, with only record h permanently lost. If the repository had disseminated only unembargoed records, then e, f, g would have also been lost to the harvester.
The repository example discussed here can be further analyzed to formulate an embargoed record identification method. The active repository contains records with publisher-imposed embargo time period of embargo length = 3 months, and the repository mandates embargo decrement = 3 updates of each embargoed record, then the embargoed records are updated with a weaker timelock every embargo length embargo decrement = 1 month.
This results in a total of three instance updates. The embargo period inception of each embargoed record is from the publication, or creation date, which is embargostart. Therefore, the end of the embargo period, embargo end for a record, can be easily projected by adding the embargo period embargo length to the datestamp embargostart. A record under embargo can be identified by comparing the datestamp at the time of data dissemination with the publisherimposed, global publisherstart datestamp and the projected embargo end datestamp. If the record is identified as under embargo, then the remaining time of the embargo period of that record is calculated. A predetermined number of embargo decrement updates of the record (three in this example) with decreasing time-lock are provided. The remaining embargo period of the record is also used to calculate the number of updates of the record (e.g., second of three updates 
IMPLEMENTATION IN MOD OAI
In response to a GetRecord or ListRecords mod oai HTTP request with metadata prefix oai didl, the embargoed identification, encryption and encapsulation components incorporated in the Apache module are invoked. Algorithm 2 describes the sequence and interaction of these components. 
2:
Records Index Creation
3:
for all records do
4:
Preservation Metadata Creation
5:
Metadata Encapsulation in MPEG-21 DIDL data item
6:
if record is under Embargo then
7:
Dynamic Embargoed Record Identification
8:
Record Datestamp modification
9:
Dynamic Embargoed Record Encryption
10:
Dynamic Embargoed Record Encapsulation
11:
end if
12:
if Include Resource by-value then
13:
Resource 
Dynamic Embargoed Record Identification
The general solution for embargoed record identification has been further developed to handle dynamic record iden-tification. Algorithm 3 has been incorporated in mod oai to identify records that are under embargo. currentT ime = current date in unix seconds {input current date from the system}
8:
f ileT ime = current record modified date,embargostart, in unix seconds
9:
if (f ileT ime < lockStart) or (f ileT ime ≤ (currentT ime − lockDuration)) then
10:
the record is not under embargo 11:
if ((f ileT ime + lockDuration) > currentT ime) then
13:
noOf SecsInInterval = (lockDuration/p)
14:
elapsedT imeF raction = (currentT ime − f ileT ime/lockDuration)
15:
intervalN o = elapsedT imeF raction * p 16:
17:
intervalsLef t = p -intervalN o
18:
lockT imeLef t = intervalsLef t * noOf SecsInInterval {lockTimeLeft is used to linearly interpolate the anticipated computation timeUnit} {calculate new timestamp of the file according to last interval update}
19:
newT imestamp = elapsedLockT ime + f ileT ime {calculating next update} 20:
21:
nextT imestamp = nextU pdate + f ileT ime
22:
convert newT imestamp and nextT imestamp integer variables from seconds to Zulu time 
28: end for
The publisher-imposed start date for the embargo period of each record has been included in the mod oai configuration file as a variable that can be modified and set by the user accordingly. The duration of the embargo period, with a granularity of days, has also been established as a known variable. The number of instance updates, or intervals during these updates, is also a known variable and is included in the configuration file as required input. These variables can be adjusted to modify the effective embargo time period for the records and the number of instance updates desired for each record under embargo. Algorithm 3 and remaining examples of embargoed record identification and encryption are based upon an embargo length = 365 days, with embargo decrement = 12 instance updates for each record. A later version of each record would correspond to a less complex time-lock puzzle that would require less computation time to break the encryption.
Algorithm 3 computes time values in unix seconds to enable mathematical manipulation on time values and then converts the time in seconds back to ISO 8061 time before being included in XML output. After identifying a record as under embargo, the algorithm first calculates the time fraction that has elapsed since the start of the embargo period. This fraction is then converted into an integer value that represents the current number of the instance update. This interval number is then used to determine the effective remaining lock-time, on which the complexity of the time-lock puzzle is dependent.
The remaining lock-time in seconds is the computation time it should take to access the record once it has been time-locked. The timed-release cryptology algorithm requires an integer input value that determines the complexity of the record encryption. Thus, various tests, described during system evaluation in section 5, have been conducted to linearly interpolate and map the remaining lock-time with an appropriate integer value that is used as the input for the embargoed record encryption algorithm.
Dynamic Embargoed Record Encryption
The LCS35 Time Capsule Crypto-Puzzle [13] , created in 1999, was designed to take about 35 years of linear computation to solve. The puzzle takes into consideration Moore's Law [11] , and anticipates that computational power will double approximately every two years. The puzzle follows the future trend described by SEMATECH National Technology Roadmap for Semiconductors [7] that predicts an exponential increase in processing speed by a factor of 13 from 1999 until 2012. A further increase in speed by a factor of 5 until 2034 has been estimated and taken into account in the algorithm. In order to ensure the computation time of 35 years, it is assumed that a faster computer will be used every year to perform the required sequential computation to break the LCS35 puzzle. Algorithm 4 has been programmed in the C programming language and incorporated in mod oai. It takes the variable timeU nit as input and outputs the time-locked instance of the record along with the puzzle variables n and t required to break the puzzle, along with the instructions on how to break the puzzle. The GMP C library 3 has been used to declare the large numbers produced in the algorithm. The logic of the timed-release cryptographic algorithm has been preserved. It has been amended to accept binary files as input, to permit all files to be accessed and encrypted irrespective of their MIME type. To allow files with various MIME types to be time-locked, it was not possible to append or include the seed value b in the file during data encryption. This implementation does not take Moore's law into account because of the anticipated relatively short embargo periods (e.g., 1-2 years). Instead, near-horizon values are chosen as described in section 5. The MD5 cryptographic hash function has been used to create 32-character hash values of the file to verify the integrity of the file contents upon decryption.
Dynamic Embargoed Record Encapsulation
The encrypted instance of the embargoed record is encapsulated in MPEG-21 DIDL XML document. This document reflects the appropriate changes in the included metadata to be identified as an encrypted instance of the record. Figure 2 is the resulting DIDL document structure that encapsulates data and metadata pertaining to a record under embargo.
The two occurrences of the last-modified datestamp of the record have been updated in the resulting XML document to reflect the latest embargoed record instance. This datestamp represents the last instance when the record was 3 http://gmplib.org/ encrypted with the latest embargo period and has been updated in the DIDL header section, in ISO 8061 [9] date format, and in the http metadata descriptor, in RFC 822 [5] date format. The resource, in either base64 format or referenced by a URI, has been relocked with a weaker time-lock. The MD5 checksum of an unlocked instance of the record has been included in a descriptor in the response to provide sufficient information for integrity verification upon record decryption. It has been encapsulated in a DIDL descriptor element.
An extra descriptor DIDL element is introduced to identify the record as time-locked and encapsulates related information such as the instance of the embargoed record update, the original start of the record embargo, and when an unlocked instance of the record can be anticipated. It also provides the variables and method to break and access the encrypted record, and includes information on the estimated computation hours required to achieve this task.
The mod oai Apache module allows the record resource to be included in the XML document by reference as well as by value. The reference URL pertaining to an encrypted record has been modified to be directed through a script that allows the file accessed to be time-locked before data display. It provides the same information included in the DIDL document required to unlock and access the encrypted record instance. When dereferencing the URI of an embargoed record, the resulting representation displays the resource in decimal values without base64 encoding, which is the original output of the timed-release puzzle. The returned page reiterates the information included in the XML document that is required to decrypt the accessed encrypted record:
This version of the record is 7 of 12 separate encryptions, each of which is successively easier to break. To solve the puzzle, first compute w = 2 (2 t ) (mod n). Then exclusive-or the result with z. (Right-justify the two strings first). The result is the secret message (8 bits per character).
SELECTING T
The timed-release cryptography algorithm has been designed to take an integer variable timeU nit as an input. This timeU nit value linearly increases the complexity of the puzzle by increasing the t value in the 2 2 t computation performed to break the file time-lock. A puzzle corresponding to a higher t value requires more time to break the encryption. This decryption time can be mapped with embargo length , the remaining embargo period of the file that was calculated during dynamic embargoed record identification. Due to the mathematical properties of this cryptography method, the time required to break the time-lock puzzle is directly dependent upon the speed of the processor used to perform the required calculations. An appropriate value of timeU nit can be selected to accurately calculate the puzzle complexity and the time required to break and access the encryption in relation to the desired processor speed.
A correlation between the remaining embargo period, the t value and embargo length on a particular computer system can be calculated by assimilating the results of the timedrelease algorithm. To compute this correlation, the timedrelease cryptography algorithm has been executed with increasing values of timeU nit to create puzzles of increasing complexity. These puzzles have then been broken to determine the amount of time required to break the time-lock and subsequently access the encrypted content. A table of increasing timeU nit values and their corresponding decryption time can be created to describe this dependency. This unlock time can then be mapped to embargo length , the remaining embargo period for a record, to ensure that the decryption time is no less than embargo length . The linear correlation between embargo length , the unlock time required, and tU, the timeUnit value, to be used for record encryption can be described as:
where x is the processor speed of the machine utilized for computation. An increase in processor speed x would result in a decrease in embrgo length . Puzzles have been created using this timed-release algorithm on various computer systems to establish a linear correlation between embargo length and tU, and to determine and analyze this variant f (x) value differing with each system speed x. Four x values have been empirically calculated. A Sun Solaris cluster of 31 nodes has been utilized for performance testing during the research. 26 nodes of this cluster have the processing speed of x = 1.6 GHz, and five nodes have a processing speed of x = 1.8 GHz. Two machines with a computation speed of x = 1 GHz and x = 0.75 GHz respectively, have also been utilized to compute and compare the time required to break the timed-release cryptography puzzle.
An identical text file was used by these machines as input to create puzzles of varying complexity by using the timedrelease algorithm, starting with the input value timeU nit = 1. This timeUnit value is used by the timed-release algorithm, as described in section 4.2, to calculate the t value used for data encryption, which remains unchanged throughout the tests performed. As described in Algorithm 4, tU linearly increases the puzzle t value. Each increment in the tU value increases the t value by a value of 5,400,000. Therefore, tU, the timeUnit value used as input in the algorithm as t = 5400000tU .
The created time-lock puzzles of varying complexity are then broken to record the amount of decryption time on the particular system. The accumulated values of effective timeU nit values and unlock time embargo length have been plotted to demonstrate a linear correlation between puzzles with increasing complexity and unlock time embargo length . All time values have been recorded in seconds time granularity. Figure 3 is a plot of the datapoints gathered by tests performed on the four classes of machines that demonstrate the linear relationship between embargo length and tU.
From the graph in Figure 3 and the corresponding f(x) values of the four x classes of machines in Table 4 , it can be discerned that the rate of increase of a particular class of machine can be projected from any one selected class of machine. An increase in the rate of change f (x) for a given class of machine is inversely proportional to the computation speed x of that class. 1079.14 1.8
959.78 Table 4 : Corresponding f(x) values of the four x classes of machines.
With the known pair of values for x = 0.75, the f(x) value of a 1GHz machine can be projected using this inverse proportion relation as 0.75 1 = f (1) 2302.16 (8) f ( The f (x k ) value corresponding to the known x k computation speed can be projected with:
A calculated f(x) value for a particular class of machine that is closer to the actual, calculated f(x) value in Table 4 indicates the observance of Moore's Law, whereby concluding that this inverse correlation can be utilized to project the f(x) value for various classes of machines.
For instance, if a file is to be locked for two years on a 2.5 GHz machine, an appropriate f(x) value corresponding to this processing speed x can be calculated. This f(x) value is the rate of change for unlock time with respect to increasing values of time Unit and can be represented as equation 7. Substituting f(x) with its calculation in equation 11 gives us the new formula for determining unlock time embargo length ,
where f (xj) and xj are a known x-f(x) value pair and x Figure 4 : File size variance of website content harvested during mod oai performance testing is the processing speed for which a rate of change is to be projected. With a known unlock time value, equivalent to embargo length , a corresponding timeU nit value to be used as input in the timed-release cryptography algorithm can be calculated as
Substituting the class 1 value as xj, and its calculated f (xj) value would result in tU = x 1727.61 embargo length (14) that can be used as a benchmark to project the timeUnit value for the desired class of machine with a known x. This formula can be utilized to calculate tU for known embargo length on the machine selected for data encryption during data dissemination via mod oai. Thus, the tU value required to time-lock a file for embargo length = 2 years, which is 63115200 seconds, on machine x = 2.5 GHz can be calculated as tU = 2.5 1727.61 63115200
= 9133.
EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
A modified version of mod oai was tested with a collection of 525 files that total 17.3 MB of data. 63% of the files are text files of various sizes, and the average size of each file is approximately 33 KB. Figure 4 shows the size of each file in relation with the number of files comprising the website. Baseline harvests were done with no time-locks, and then harvests were d one with embargo length of one year. A variable, modoai encode size, contained in the module's configuration file, determines the maximum allowable file size for inclusion by-value in the resulting XML document. It subsequently controls the size of each resulting XML document during data dissemination. Therefore, differing harvest times of the website with increasing values of modoai encode size have been collected to analyze the performance of mod oai with increasing quantity of timelocked data in the resulting XML document in response to a mod oai ListRecords request. Table 5 : Wallclock harvest times of website with varied modoai encode size and embargoed content.
As shown in Table 5 and Figure 5 , an increase in the modoai encode size results in a larger XML document response and fewer number of total XML document responses to a ListRecords request. An increase in modoai encode size results in an increase in the number of files included byvalue via base64 data inclusion in the data harvest. With no data under embargo, there is no lock-time overhead, and the increase in the modoai encode size favors the increase in by-value data inclusion and results in faster data dissemination.
With the entire website content under embargo, an increase in modoai encode size leads to an increase in the harvest time due to the time overhead required to lock the increasing volume of data to be included in the response as base64 datastream. The entire website content is harvested as a base64 encoded datastream in 3.2 hours, with modoai encode size set to 10 MB. An increase in by-value content inclusion during content dissemination leads to an exponential increase in harvest time. The file contents of the website were individually timelocked, with embargo time-period embargo length = one year, to determine that the amount of time required to time-lock a file is dependent upon the size of the file. Figure 6 is the resulting graph representing the time required to time-lock individual files, in log representation, in relation to their respective file size. 
CHUNKED ENCRYPTION
Since time-locking was discovered to have a run-time complexity of O(n 2 ), an optimization was needed to feasibly handle typical file sizes. For example, a file of size 100 KB on a 1.8 GHz machine requires 3 seconds to be time-locked, whereas a 200KB file requires 13 seconds. If the 200KB file is divided into two "chunks" of 100 KB each, the 200 KB file can be time-locked, without parallelism, in six seconds, resulting in a 54% improvement. During the decryption the chunks can be decrypted individually then concatenated to reproduce the original file.
This "chunked" time-lock data model has been included in mod oai to benefit from this observed speedup during during dynamic data dissemination. A chunk size of 10 KB has been selected for implementation in mod oai since we empirically determined it requires about 0.2 CPU seconds for time-lock computation. Any file residing in the website with file size greater than 10 KB that is to be included as an encrypted datastream in the resulting XML document has been divided into 10 KB chunks to achieve faster encryption time. The algorithm still runs in O(n 2 ) time, but with a more favorable constant. Table 6 and figure 7 shows the results of harvesting with 10KB chunks, as well as the times required to harvest without chunking, and without time-locking. The times are the mean of five separate harvests.
A comparison of the plotted times between regular timelock encryption and chunked encryption reveals a 70× speedup in harvest times. Even though an exponential increase in harvest time is still observed, the chunked harvest time curve has been pushed to the right for common file sizes, resulting in a slower increase in exponential harvest time. As observed from the graph, with modoai encode size set to 15 MB, chunked encryption results in a speedup of 70, with the harvest time reduced from 3.2 hours to only 2.6 minutes. This time Table 6 : Wallclock harvest times of website with using "chunked" time-lock encryption.
penalty for disseminating embargoed content is within the realistic, feasible range of website harvest time. The MPEG21 DIDL document format represented in Figure 2 has been modified to reflect the inclusion of chunked time-lock encryption. In this optimization, the size of each encrypted chunk is set to 10 KB. Every file of size greater than 10 KB has been divided into 10 KB chunks and individually encrypted. Each file chunk has been encapsulated into one component. Therefore, each chunked encrypted file, contained in a DIDL record entity, contains multiple components. Chunked records in the exported XML document can be identified by their file size, as well as the number of components contained in each record.
Each record component needs to be identified for accurate reordering, decryption and reassembly of contained data chunks into one file. These components have been associated with Identifiers in increasing lexicographical order, which have been encapsulated in an identifier entity within each component. A descriptor has also been inserted in each component to provide additional information regarding the total number of chunks contained in the record to ensure that each isolated component contains sufficient information required for reassembly of chunks into one file. This modified document model still contains the original record identifier and related metadata for record identification. 
FUTURE WORK AND CONCLUSIONS
We have introduced the "Preservation Risk Interval" problem associated with embargoed content caused due to limited diffusion of embargoed scholarly material within the digital library community. The Time-Locked Embargo Framework introduces the identification of embargoed content and calculates the required complexity of the time-lock puzzle to be created for that content. During the integration of timelock puzzles into mod oai, an initial system evaluation revealed that the amount of time required to create time-lock puzzles during dynamic DIDL document creation increases exponentially with the size of the embargoed file. This exponential increase in time overhead has been reduced by splitting the files into 10 KB data chunks for faster encryption and harvest time. The framework has also modified the MPEG-21 DIDL complex object format utilized by mod oai to accurately encapsulate chunked embargoed content and related metadata. With the use of the expanded mod oai module, resources under embargo can be exchanged between a much broader scholarly community for the purpose of digital preservation as well as content diffusion.
Optimum chunk size should be investigated further. 10KB was empirically determined for the class of machines we used, but other values or approaches should be investigated. Alternate approaches could include using parallel machines for time-locking, or "pre-locking" popular content prior to distribution (the current implementation dynamically locks on dissemination, trading time for space by not requiring the overhead of cache maintenance). There could also be hybrid approaches where the content is locked with conventional encryption and the only the keys are time-locked. Furthermore, the time-lock approach could be defined as an HTTP "Content-Encoding" (like "gzip" or "deflate") and be used outside of OAI-PMH.
